Data-driven analysis for NAEA contract negotiations · Nazareth Area School District
7 Tools · Figures from the contracts on file · 11 districts · Reviewed against contract documents Sept 28, 2026Salary is only part of what a district pays and a teacher receives. This tool adds health-insurance waiver payments and longevity pay to each district's contract salary for the step and lane you pick. The PSERS employer rate is the same for all PA districts, so the district's pension cost is shown in its own column and is not added into the pay total. Salaries are each contract's 2024-25 schedule. A district is left out of a lane it has no matching column for.
⚠️ PSERS note: The employer pension rate used here (33.59% for FY2026-27) is the district's gross contribution. PSERS reports that more than 80% of this rate goes toward paying down pension debt, not toward the teacher's individual pension benefit (PSERS web source, not a document on file — verify before citing). The Commonwealth also reimburses districts for a substantial share of this cost. The "Employer PSERS Cost" column shows the district's gross outlay, applied to the 2024-25 salaries shown, and is kept out of the pay total — not what the teacher earns each year. Treat it as a district cost, not a compensation benefit, when negotiating.
| District | Base Salary contract schedule, year shown |
+ HI Waiver | + Longevity annual, at years of service chosen |
= Annual Cash Pay | Employer PSERS Cost FY2026-27: 33.59% gross · district cost, not in total |
At Retirement one-time; not in total |
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After 15+ years of continuous Nazareth service, Nazareth makes a non-elective TSA contribution equal to final year's salary × (1 + 1% per year of Nazareth service) (Appendix A, Item 6; notice by March 1 of the final year). For a 30-year Nazareth teacher at Step 16 M+45 ($103,788, 2024-25): $103,788 × 1.30 = $134,924 one-time retirement contribution. It is an alternative to the $40/day unused-sick-day payment, not an addition to it.
⚠️ For comparison - Northampton pays $4,800/yr to teachers who waive district health insurance. It would take about 28 years of waiving ($134,924 ÷ $4,800 = 28.1) for that payment to add up to the one-time TSA amount above. For teachers with outside coverage (military/Tricare, spouse plan, Medicare), the waiver gap is $0.
PSERS employer rate: 33.90% (FY2024-25), 34.00% (FY2025-26), 33.59% (FY2026-27, used here). Source: pa.gov/agencies/psers (web source; not a document on file). Employer pension cost is the district's gross contribution — not the teacher's earned benefit (see note above). Health-insurance premium values are not included for enrolled teachers: district premium costs are not on file (they would require an RTK request for each district). Salaries, waiver payments, longevity and retirement payouts are from each district's contract on file.
Model any proposed raise against Nazareth's actual financials. Turns "we can't afford it" into a quantified, fact-based response. All financial data from NCES FY2021-22 and official district budget reports.
| Year | Cumulative Raise % compounded | Est. Payroll | Added Cost That Year vs. today's payroll | As % of Revenue 2%/yr growth assumed | Cumulative Added Cost |
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Model: the raise is applied to the estimated payroll each year and compounds; step movement is not modelled. Revenue projection: FY2021-22 revenue ($104.4M) as year 1, growing 2% a year compounded — an illustrative assumption, not a district forecast. Teacher count estimated from student-teacher ratio (14.36) and enrollment (~5,800) (estimates — source needed). Total payroll estimated from teacher count × average salary. Actual figures available via RTK request for annual financial report. Revenue/expenditure from NCES FY2021-22. ⚠️ Current FY2026-27 budget estimated at ~$121M (WFMZ); official figures require RTK.
If a teacher leaves Nazareth and restarts at Step 1 in another district, how many years before cumulative earnings catch up? This is a critical retention argument - and a reality check for teachers considering leaving.
Assumptions: both paths use the schedule shown (2024-25) and the same annual raise, chosen above, applied to both. The teacher moves up one step a year and is placed at Step 1 in the new district (many districts credit prior experience; check the destination's placement rules). Nazareth's B column ends at Step 8.
| Year | Stay: Annual | Transfer: Annual | Annual Gap | Stay: Cumulative | Transfer: Cumulative | Cumulative Gap |
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What does each step actually pay? A weak step schedule front-loads compensation risk on new teachers and rewards staying put. Shows exactly where each schedule is strong, flat, or stagnant. Note: fewer total steps = faster to max (but not necessarily a higher max). Wilson SD is not offered here: its schedule has half-steps and its step numbers are not years of service.
| Step | Salary | $ Increment | % Increment | Quality |
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| District | Steps | Start MA | Max MA | Total Range | Avg $/Step | Years to Max* | Assessment |
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MA lane, figures year as labelled (2024-25 unless noted). *Assumes one step per year, except Wilson, whose Exhibit A-2 places Step 16 at 19+ credited years. Parkland's contract notes that its step numbers "do not refer to years of service".
Knowing when other districts' contracts expire - and which of the contracts on file have already expired - is critical context. Expired contracts represent both weak comparison data and powerful rhetorical leverage: "If they haven't settled either, why is their expired rate our ceiling?"
Every additional work day has a dollar value. Nazareth's 189-day year is 5 days more than East Stroudsburg's 184 (its 2024-30 contract) - a full extra week of work each year. This tool quantifies it.
| District | Work Days | Starting MA Salary | Daily Rate | vs. Nazareth Daily Rate | Extra Days vs. Fewest |
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Career-end compensation - longevity pay, sick day accumulation value, and retirement bonuses - can add substantially to a teacher's total career earnings. Nazareth's retirement TSA provision is a major hidden strength. Its $0 longevity pay is a hidden weakness.
| District | Longevity Pay (annual rate in final year · career total) |
Trigger | Sick Day Payout ($/day × unused days, caps applied) |
Retirement Bonus | Est. Career-End Total (at the inputs above) |
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Longevity uses 2024-25 rates (East Stroudsburg: its 2024-30 contract's rates, which start in 2025-26), paid in each year of service from the trigger year to the final year. East Stroudsburg's sick payout is valued at its $200/day floor (the contract pays the substitute rate if that is higher). Sick-day payouts apply each contract's service requirement and cap. Nazareth's $40/day payment is an alternative to the TSA contribution; the larger of the two is counted. Not valued here (premium-cost data not on file): Bethlehem's sick-days-for-retiree-health option, Pen Argyl's severance, Easton's retiree HRA, Saucon Valley's retiree health option, Wilson's $340/yr severance beyond 17 years, and retiree medical in any district.
Pennsylvania law (24 P.S. §11-1154) entitles professional employees who move between PA school districts to carry accumulated leave, up to a maximum of 25 working days. Wilson SD's 25-day transfer clause mirrors the statute, and Parkland's contract cites §1154. East Stroudsburg and Northampton also address transferred days (both exclude them from the retirement payout).
So a teacher with 150 accumulated days who leaves Nazareth keeps up to 25 of them by law, but the other 125 do not transfer. At Nazareth's $40/day, those 125 days are worth $5,000; at Northampton's $90/day, $11,250. Contract language letting more days count - for example, crediting prior-district days toward the retirement payout - costs the district little while reducing the financial cost of leaving.